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Counterpart Theory Vindicated: A Reply to Merricks

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Abstract

The paper shows – contra what has been argued by Trenton Merricks – that counterpart theory, when conjoined with composition as identity, does not entail mereological essentialism. What Merricks's argument overlooks is that contingent identity is but one of the effects of grounding identity across possible worlds on similarity.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, 1150 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY 10027-6902;, Email: ab2058@columbia.edu

Publication date: 2005-03-01

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