Skip to main content

National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities

Buy Article:

$51.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)



We analyze the role of National Treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy. A social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good. We show that whether National Treatment of standards interferes with welfare-maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker (consumption or emissions tax) and differences in the cost of complying with the standard. We also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal. This asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare-maximizing policy to violate National Treatment.

Keywords: F13; F18; F42; H21; H23; H41

Document Type: Research Article


Affiliations: 1: Food and Resource Economics, University of British Columbia 2: International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC

Publication date: November 1, 2008

Access Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Partial Open Access Content
Partial Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content
Cookie Policy
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more