Skip to main content

Bilateral war in a multilateral world: carrots and sticks for conflict resolution

Buy Article:

$51.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Abstract. 

This paper constructs a three-country, specific-factor, trade-theoretic model in which two of the countries are in conflict and where war effort is determined endogenously in a Nash equilibrium. The third country does not take part in the war, but trades with the warring countries. In the framework, we examine, inter alia, how war and welfare are affected by globalization and by two instruments available to the third country – one carrot and one stick. Our overall conclusion is that the third parties do have the incentives for, and can play an effective role in, conflict resolution. JEL classification: F02, F11, H56, H77

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2966.2007.00447.x

Affiliations: Department of Economics, Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Publication date: 2007-11-01

  • Access Key
  • Free ContentFree content
  • Partial Free ContentPartial Free content
  • New ContentNew content
  • Open Access ContentOpen access content
  • Partial Open Access ContentPartial Open access content
  • Subscribed ContentSubscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed ContentPartial Subscribed content
  • Free Trial ContentFree trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more