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The returns from rent-seeking: campaign contributions, firm subsidies and the Byrd Amendment

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This is the first empirical study to examine Congressional support of a new law that distributes antidumping duties to protected firms. Because the law produces a transparent measure of how much each firm was rewarded for its efforts to secure the bill's passage, it provides researchers with a unique opportunity to study the link between the expected financial returns to firms, campaign contributions, and Congressional behaviour. Our results indicate that campaign contributions from beneficiaries increased the likelihood that lawmakers would sponsor the law, while contributions from the law's beneficiaries increased with the rewards they expected to receive.
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Keywords: D72; F13

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, St Joseph's University 2: Department of Economics, American University

Publication date: 2006-11-01

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