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Rebates as incentives to exclusivity

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Abstract:

Abstract. 

We show how rebates (or fidelity discounts) that take the form of lump‐sum payments made to retailers can be used by an incumbent manufacturer to achieve exclusivity and to deter the entry of a more efficient rival. The results, which hold whatever the degree of differentiation between retailers and whatever the cost advantage of the entrant, are found, despite minimizing asymmetries that may favour the incumbent. As such, there is no need to introduce buyers’ disorganization, discriminatory offers, economies of scale, non‐coincident markets, or liquidated damages to find that exclusivity can lead to anti‐competitive effects. JEL classification: L12, L42

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2006.00356.x

Affiliations: Competition Policy Branch, Competition Bureau

Publication date: May 1, 2006

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