Rationalized subjective equilibria in repeated games

Author: Hidetsugu O.

Source: Canadian Journal of Economics, Volume 36, Number 1, March 2003 , pp. 168-191(24)

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Abstract:

The purpose of this paper is to provide a new equilibrium concept of repeated games that involve incomplete information (rationalized subjective equilibrium) and a related framework (subjective game), and to analyse the relationships between players’ subjective images of games and the realized outcomes. We demonstrate the relationships among rationalized subjective equilibria, subjective equilibria, and original Nash equilibria by providing several examples. We also present several theorems analogous to the ordinary folk theorem and a simple application using the Cournot duopoly model. JEL Classification: C70, C72 Equilibres subjectifs rationalise´s dans des jeux re´pe´te´s

L’objectif de cet article est de proposer un nouveau concept d’e´quilibre dans les jeux re´pe´te´s où l’information est incomplète (e´quilibre subjectif rationalise´) et un cadre d’analyse approprie´( jeu subjectif ), ainsi que d’analyser les rapports entre les images subjectives que les acteurs ont des jeux et de leurs re´sultats. On montre les rapports entre e´quilibres subjectifs rationalise´s, e´quilibres subjectifs, et e´quilibres à la Nash à l’aide de divers exemples. On pre´sente aussi plusieurs the´orèmes analogues au « ordinary folk theorem » et une application simple utilisant le modèle de duopole de Cournot.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540-5982.00009

Affiliations: 1: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

Publication date: 2003-03-01