Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies
Author: Ziad A.
Source: Bulletin of Economic Research, Volume 55, Number 3, July 2003 , pp. 311-317(7)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Abstract:
We consider an n-person non-zero-sum non-cooperative game in normal form, where the strategy sets are some closed intervals of the real line. It is shown that if the pay-off functions are continuous on the whole space and if for each pay-off function the smallest local maximum in the strategy variable is a global maximum, then the game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.Keywords: continuous game; existence; Nash equilibria; pure strategy; supermodular game; C72
Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8586.00178
Affiliations: 1: Centre de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Econométrie
Publication date: 2003-07-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Economics
- By this author: Ziad A.

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