Costly Signaling and Cooperation

Authors: GINTIS H.¹; SMITH E.A.L.D.E.N.²; BOWLES S.³

Source: Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 213, Number 1, November 2001 , pp. 103-119(17)

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Abstract:

We propose an explanation of cooperation among unrelated members of a social group in which cooperation evolves because it constitutes an honest signal of the member's quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor, and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner. Our model is framed as a multi-player public goods game that involves no repeated or assortative interactions, so that non-cooperation would be a dominant strategy if there were no signaling benefits. We show that honest signaling of underlying quality by providing a public good to group members can be evolutionarily stable, and can proliferate in a population in which it is initially rare, provided that certain plausible conditions hold, including a link between group-beneficial signaling and underlying qualities of the signaler that would be of benefit to a potential mate or alliance partner. Our model applies to a range of cooperative interactions, including unconditionally sharing individually consumable resources, participating in group raiding or defense, and punishing free-riding or other violations of social norms. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, U.S.A. 2: Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 98195-3100, U.S.A. 3: Santa Fe Institute and Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, U.S.A.

Publication date: 2001-11-01