Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism

Author: Sobel J.

Source: Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 37, Number 1, October 2001 , pp. 196-215(20)

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Abstract:

Given n agents with who wish to divide m commodities, consider the n-person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave increasing utility functions, and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution. Any constrained equal-income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is shown to ba a Nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game. Conditions are presented under which these are the only pure strategy equilibrium outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D71. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.

Keywords: utilitarian solution; bargaining; preference revelation

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California, 92093

Publication date: 2001-10-01