Games and Economic Behavior

Adaptive Learning versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
pp. 1-25(25)
Authors: Abbink K.; Bolton G.E.; Sadrieh A.; Tang F-F.

Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games
pp. 26-39(14)
Authors: Al-Najjar N.I.; Smorodinsky R.

Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution
pp. 40-78(39)
Authors: Barberà S.; Maschler M.; Shalev J.

Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest
pp. 79-120(42)
Authors: Blume A.; DeJong D.V.; Kim Y-G.; Sprinkle G.B.

On Money Pumps
pp. 121-160(40)
Authors: Cubitt R.P.; Sugden R.

The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games
pp. 161-169(9)
Authors: Güth W.; Huck S.; Müller W.

Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining with Arbitration
pp. 170-195(26)
Authors: Manzini P.; Mariotti M.

Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism
pp. 196-215(20)
Author: Sobel J.

Cooperation, Secret Handshakes, and Imitation in the Prisoners' Dilemma
pp. 216-242(27)
Authors: Wiseman T.; Yilankaya O.