@article {Mailath:February 1997:0899-8256:193,
	author = "Mailath G.J.",
	author = "Samuelson L.",
	author = "Swinkels J.M.",
	title = "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?",
	journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
	volume = "18",
	year = "February 1997",
	abstract = "<P> A strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit. A decision-theoretic implementation of sequential rationality, strategic independence respecting equilibrium (SIRE), is defined and compared to proper equilibrium, using lexicographic probability systems. Finally, we give tremble-based characterizations, which do not involve structural features of the game, of the rankings of strategies that underlie proper equilibrium and SIRE. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72.</P>",
	pages = "193-218(26)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/ga/1997/00000018/00000002/art00518"
}