How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?

Authors: Mailath G.J.¹; Samuelson L.²; Swinkels J.M.³

Source: Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 18, Number 2, February 1997 , pp. 193-218(26)

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Abstract:

A strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit. A decision-theoretic implementation of sequential rationality, strategic independence respecting equilibrium (SIRE), is defined and compared to proper equilibrium, using lexicographic probability systems. Finally, we give tremble-based characterizations, which do not involve structural features of the game, of the rankings of strategies that underlie proper equilibrium and SIRE. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19104-6297 2: Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin, 53706 3: Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois, 60208-2009

Publication date: 1997-02-01