Games and Economic Behavior

Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games
pp. 141-158(18)
Authors: Cripps M.W.; Thomas J.P.

A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
pp. 159-175(17)
Authors: Forges F.; Minelli E.

An Optimal Auction for Complements
pp. 176-192(17)
Author: Levin J.

How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?
pp. 193-218(26)
Authors: Mailath G.J.; Samuelson L.; Swinkels J.M.

Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance
pp. 219-245(27)
Authors: Marx L.M.; Swinkels J.M.

Sequentially Optimal Auctions
pp. 246-276(31)
Authors: McAfee R.P.; Vincent D.

An Axiomatization of Nash Equilibria in Economic Situations
pp. 277-285(9)
Authors: Peleg B.; Sudholter P.

Learning to Learn, Pattern Recognition, and Nash Equilibrium
pp. 286-331(46)
Author: Sonsino D.

Author Index for Volume 18
pp. 332-332(1)