On Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Finitely Repeated Games

Author: Wen Q.

Source: Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 13, Number 1, April 1996 , pp. 286-300(15)

Publisher: Academic Press

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Abstract:

This paper studies renegotiation-proof equilibria of Benoit and Krishna (1993) in finitely repeated games with more than two players. We provide a simple characterization of the set of average payoffs from renegotiation-proof equilibria: the limiting set of average equilibrium payoffs is either efficient or dimensionally small as the horizon of the repeated game goes to infinity. Two sufficient conditions for the former to occur are provided. An example shows that those conditions cannot be weakened. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: Department of Economics, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4, Canada:

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