On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games

Author: Watts A.

Source: Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 13, Number 1, April 1996 , pp. 269-285(17)

Publisher: Academic Press

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Abstract:

In an average surplus sharing game, such as a Cournot oligopoly, a group of agents share a production process. Each contributes an amount of input to the process, and output is divided in proportion to the amount of input contributed. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is needed for any type of comparative static analysis. However, general uniqueness results for concave games have restrictive assumptions on preferences and technology; specifically, the conditions needed for uniqueness become more difficult to meet as the number of players increases. A new theorem for uniqueness with easily interpretable conditions is given which is independent of the number of players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, D43.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Box 1819, Station B, Nashville, Tennessee, 37235:

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