How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention?

Authors: Shin H.S.¹; Williamson T.^{2, 3}

Source: Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 13, Number 1, April 1996 , pp. 252-268(17)

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Abstract:

We study Bayesian coordination games in which players choose actions conditional on the realization of their respective signals. Due to differential information, the players do not have common knowledge that a particular game is being played. However, they do have common beliefs with specified probabilities concerning their environment. In our framework, any equilibrium set of rules must be simple enough so that the actions of all players are common belief with probability 1 at every state. Common belief with probability close to 1 will not do. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Nuffield College, Oxford, OX1 1NF, United Kingdom 2: University College, Oxford, OX1 4BH, United Kingdom 3: Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9JX, United Kingdom

Publication date: 1996-04-01