Journal of Economic Theory

Financial Collapse: A Lesson from the Great Depression
pp. 159-190(32)
Authors: Cooper R.; Corbae D.

Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games
pp. 191-222(32)
Author: Hellwig C.

On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models
pp. 223-252(30)
Authors: Oechssler J.; Riedel F.

On Learning to Cooperate
pp. 253-287(35)
Author: Anthonisen N.

p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics
pp. 288-310(23)
Author: Oyama D.

On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption
pp. 311-335(25)
Authors: Hauk E.; Saez-Marti M.

Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson–Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem
pp. 336-355(20)
Authors: McKelvey R.D.; Page T.

Intertemporal Equity and Efficient Allocation of Resources
pp. 356-376(21)
Author: Mitra T.

The Package Assignment Model
pp. 377-406(30)
Authors: Bikhchandani S.; Ostroy J.M.

Sharing Rules in Teams
pp. 407-420(14)
Author: Nandeibam S.

Another Look at the Radner–Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information
pp. 421-452(32)
Authors: Chade H.; Schlee E.

Sharing a River
pp. 453-462(10)
Authors: Ambec S.; Sprumont Y.

Time Horizon and the Discount Rate
pp. 463-473(11)
Author: Gollier C.

Iterated Weak Dominance in Strictly Competitive Games of Perfect Information
pp. 474-482(9)
Author: Ewerhart C.

Demand Aggregation and the Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference
pp. 483-489(7)
Authors: Bandyopadhyay T.; Bandyopadhyay B.; Pattanaik P.K.

The Effect of Disagreement on Noncooperative Bargaining
pp. 490-499(10)
Authors: Manzini P.; Mariotti M.

The Society for the Promotion of Economic Theory
pp. 500-500(1)

Papers to Appear in Forthcoming Issues
pp. 501-501(1)

Author Index for Volume 107
pp. 502-502(1)