Prudence, Justice, Benevolence, and Sex: Evidence from Similar Bargaining Games

Authors: Van Huyck J.; Battalio R.

Source: Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 104, Number 1, May 2002 , pp. 227-246(20)

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Abstract:

Most learning experiments involve repeated play of exactly the same situation and, hence, can not discriminate between learning to use a deductive principle and other forms of routine learning. In this paper, subjects confront a sequence of similar, but not identical, bargaining games all of which can be solved using the same deductive principles. Conventions based on these deductive principles emerge within 70 periods in 5 of 26 eight-person cohorts. We found no economically significant differences between all male and all female cohorts. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, C92, D83. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

Keywords: bargaining; equilibrium selection; learning; evolutionary games; gender differences

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, 77843-4228

Publication date: 2002-05-01