The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments

Authors: Reny P.J.¹; Holtz Wooders M.²

Source: Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 70, Number 2, August 1996 , pp. 298-311(14)

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Abstract:

A payoff for a game is partnered if it admits no asymmetric dependencies. We introduce the partnered core of a game without side payments and show that the partnered core of a balanced game is nonempty. The result is a strengthening of Scarf's Theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced game without side payments. In addition, it is shown that if there are at most a countable number of points in the partnered core of a game then at least one core point is minimally partnered, meaning that no player requires any other player in particular to obtain his part of the core payoff. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15260 2: Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 1A1

Publication date: 1996-08-01