Integrating experiential–phenomenological methods and neuroscience to study neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness

Authors: Price D.D.1; Barrell J.J.1; Rainville P.2

Source: Consciousness and Cognition, Volume 11, Number 4, December 2002 , pp. 593-608(16)

Publisher: Academic Press

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Abstract:

Understanding the nature of pain at least partly depends on recognizing its inherent first person epistemology and on using a first person experiential and third person experimental approach to study it. This approach may help to understand some of the neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness by integrating experiential–phenomenological methods with those of neuroscience. Examples that approximate this strategy include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities and brain imaging-psychophysical studies wherein sensory and affective qualities of pain are correlated with cerebral cortical activity. The experiential paradigm ofPrice and Barrell (1980) offers the possibility of improved designs and methods for investigating neural mechanisms underlying pain and consciousness.

© 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1053-8100(02)00018-1

Affiliations: 1: Departments of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery and Neuroscience, Health Science Center, D8-44, University of Florida, P.O. Box 100416, 1600 Southwest Archer Rd., Gainesville, FL 32610-0416, USA 2: De´partment de stomatologie, Faculte´ de me´decine dentaire, Universite´ de Montre´al, Montre´al, Qc, Canada H3J 3J7

Publication date: 2002-12-01

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