Feelings and Judgments of Knowing: Is There a Special Noetic State?

Author: Metcalfe J.

Source: Consciousness and Cognition, Volume 9, Number 2, June 2000 , pp. 178-186(9)

Publisher: Academic Press

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Abstract:

A. Koriat distinguishes between feeling-based and inferentially based feeling-of-knowing judgments. The former are attributable to partial information that is activated in implicit memory but not fully articulated. They are not, however, attributable to direct access to the target—an hypothesis that Koriat specifically repudiates. While there is considerable merit in the distinction that Koriat draws, and his emphasis on the possibility that people base at least some of their metacognitive judgments on implicit information seems well founded, it is argued that his rejection of the direct access view is premature. There may be a state—a true noetic state—in which people actually know the answer before they are able to express it. A case is made for further consideration of the scientific merits of the direct-access view of the noetic feelings people experience in imminent tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.

Language: English

Document Type: Editorial

Affiliations: Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, New York, 10027:

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