The Fall of Enron

Authors: Healy, Paul M.; Palepu, Krishna G.

Source: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 17, Number 2, 1 June 2003 , pp. 3-26(24)

Publisher: American Economic Association

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Abstract:

The financial reporting and disclosure problems at Enron, as well as the high market valuations for its stock raise troubling questions about the functioning of capital market intermediaries, regulators and governance experts whose are supposed to ensure the effective functioning of the stock market. This paper examines the functions of key capital market intermediaries and analyzes how their own governance and incentive problems may have contributed to Enron's rise and fall. We conclude by proposing system modifications to resolve the observed problems.

Document Type: Miscellaneous

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533003765888403

Publication date: 2003-06-01

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The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JEP) attempts to fill a gap between the general interest press and most other academic economics journals. The journal aims to publish articles that will serve several goals: to synthesize and integrate lessons learned from active lines of economic research; to provide economic analysis of public policy issues; to encourage cross-fertilization of ideas among the fields of thinking; to offer readers an accessible source for state-of-the-art economic thinking; to suggest directions for future research; to provide insights and readings for classroom use; and to address issues relating to the economics profession.
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