The economics of information has identified an important role for government to correct situations where competition is not sufficient to reveal valuable information to consumers. Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil's Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency provides a thorough discussion of government-mandated disclosure policies. I use their book to frame an empirical assessment of whether these—and other information policies—have significantly reduced the costs to consumers created by imperfect information. My conclusion, which calls for more research, is that government information policies have amounted to weak solutions in search of a problem.
The Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) began publication in 1969 under the auspices of the American Economic Association with quarterly issues appearing in March, June, September, and December. JEL contains survey and review articles, book reviews, an annotated bibliography of newly published books, and a list of current dissertations in North American universities.