Author: Ohlendorf, Susanne

Source: The American Economic Review, Volume 99, Number 4, September 2009 , pp. 1608-1618(11)

Publisher: American Economic Association

Abstract:

This paper examines the efficiency of expectation damages as a breach remedy in a bilateral trade setting with renegotiation and relationship-specific investment by the buyer and the seller. As demonstrated by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), no contract that specifies only a fixed quantity and a fixed per-unit price can induce efficient investment if marginal cost is constant and deterministic. We show that this result does not extend to more general payoff functions. If both parties face the risk of breaching, the first best becomes attainable with a simple price-quantity contract.

Document Type: Short communication

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1608

Publication date: 2009-09-01

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• The American Economic Review is a general-interest economics journal. The journal is published quarterly and contains articles on a broad range of topics. Established in 1911, the AER is among the nation's oldest and most respected scholarly journals in the economics profession.
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