Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of Intervention

Authors: Ennis, Huberto M.; Keister, Todd

Source: The American Economic Review, Volume 99, Number 4, September 2009 , pp. 1588-1607(20)

Publisher: American Economic Association

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Abstract:

We study ex post efficient policy responses to a run on the banking system and the ex ante incentives these responses create. We show that the efficient response to a run is typically not to freeze all remaining deposits, since doing so imposes heavy costs on some individuals. Instead, once a run is underway, (benevolent) government institutions would allow additional deposit withdrawals, placing further strain on the banking system. When depositors anticipate these extra withdrawals, their incentive to participate in the run increases. In fact, ex post efficient interventions can generate the conditions necessary for a self-fulfilling run to occur.

Document Type: Short communication

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1588

Publication date: 2009-09-01

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The American Economic Review is a general-interest economics journal. The journal is published quarterly and contains articles on a broad range of topics. Established in 1911, the AER is among the nation's oldest and most respected scholarly journals in the economics profession.
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