Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values
Authors: Ivanov, Asen; Levin, Dan; Peck, James
Source: The American Economic Review, Volume 99, Number 4, September 2009 , pp. 1484-1507(24)
Publisher: American Economic Association
Abstract:
We experimentally test an endogenous-timing investment model in which subjects privately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment return. Subjects overinvest, relative to Nash. We separately consider whether subjects draw inferences, in hindsight, and use foresight to delay profitable investment and learn from market activity. In contrast to Nash, cursed equilibrium, and level-k predictions, behavior hardly changes across our experimental treatments. Maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent with belief-based theories. We offer an explanation in terms of boundedly rational rules of thumb, based on insights about the game, which provides a better fit than quantal response equilibrium.Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1484
Publication date: 2009-09-01
- The American Economic Review is a general-interest economics journal. The journal is published quarterly and contains articles on a broad range of topics. Established in 1911, the AER is among the nation's oldest and most respected scholarly journals in the economics profession.
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- By this author: Ivanov, Asen ; Levin, Dan ; Peck, James

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