Institution Formation in Public Goods Games
Authors: Kosfeld, Michael; Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno
Source: The American Economic Review, Volume 99, Number 4, September 2009 , pp. 1335-1355(21)
Publisher: American Economic Association
Abstract:
Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process.Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1335
Publication date: 2009-09-01
- The American Economic Review is a general-interest economics journal. The journal is published quarterly and contains articles on a broad range of topics. Established in 1911, the AER is among the nation's oldest and most respected scholarly journals in the economics profession.
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- By this author: Kosfeld, Michael ; Okada, Akira ; Riedl, Arno

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