Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation

Authors: Blume, Andreas; Duffy, John; Franco, April M.

Source: The American Economic Review, Volume 99, Number 4, September 2009 , pp. 1178-1205(28)

Publisher: American Economic Association

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Abstract:

We experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. Our objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of others. We test the predictions of a stylized, rational agent model of organizational learning that provides sharp predictions as to how learning members of an organization might cope with the simultaneous learning of others as a function of fundamental variables, e.g., firm size and the discount factor. While the problem of learning while others are learning is quite difficult, we find support for the comparative static predictions of the model's unique symmetric equilibrium.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1178

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