Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory

Authors: Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus

Source: The American Economic Review, Volume 98, Number 3, June 2008 , pp. 990-1008(19)

Publisher: American Economic Association

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Abstract:

Desire for social esteem is a source of prosocial behavior. We develop a model in which actors' utility of esteem depends on the audience. In a principal-agent setting, we show that the model can account for motivational crowding out. Control systems and pecuniary incentives erode morale by signaling to the agent that the principal is not worth impressing. The model also offers an explanation for why agents are motivated by unconditionally high pay and by mission-oriented principals.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.990

Publication date: 2008-06-01

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The American Economic Review is a general-interest economics journal. The journal is published quarterly and contains articles on a broad range of topics. Established in 1911, the AER is among the nation's oldest and most respected scholarly journals in the economics profession.
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