Author: Pande R.

Source: The American Economic Review, Volume 93, Number 4, 1 September 2003 , pp. 1132-1151(20)

Publisher: American Economic Association

Abstract:

A basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation, as practiced in Indian states, to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making. I find that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. This finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case. (JEL D72, D78, H11, H50)

Document Type: Forum article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282803769206232

Publication date: 2003-09-01

More about this publication?

• The American Economic Review is a general-interest economics journal. The journal is published quarterly and contains articles on a broad range of topics. Established in 1911, the AER is among the nation's oldest and most respected scholarly journals in the economics profession.
• Editorial Board
• Information for Authors
• Subscribe to this Title
• Membership Information
• Terms & Conditions
• e-Publications for AEA Members
• AEAweb
• ingentaconnect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites

Related content

• In this: publication
• By this: publisher
• In this Subject: Economics
• By this author: Pande R.

Website © Publishing Technology. Article copyright remains with the publisher, society or author(s) as specified within the article.

• Terms and conditions
• Privacy policy
• Information for advertisers